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An Alternative View of Uncertainty in Bilateral
Bargaining Models with Incomplete Information
Javier Gonza´lez and Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov
Abstract. This paper seeks to analyze the implications of relaxing the assumption
of rationality by using incomplete information. Specifically, we want to analyze the
implications on the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium when individuals form
expectations with different distributions of all possible states. This is done by pos-
tulating an alternative view of uncertainty in decision making in economic interac-
tions. Thus an alternative model of bilateral bargaining with incomplete information
is formulated.
1 Introduction
Over the last 60 years game theory has become an important tool in economic mod-
eling of strategic decision making in interactive situations. Particularly, game theo-
retic models have provided a solid framework for the study of strategic interaction
previously lacking in the field of economics. The introduction of a higher level of
mathematical precision and sophistication has come, however, at the expense of
accuracy of its predictions and consistency with observed behavior. That is, funda-
mental assumptions have become more restrictive in the development of oversimpli-
fied models trying to predict behavior. One such fundamental assumption in game
theory is rational behavior by the decision-maker, or rationality [8]. Within the con-
text of game theory rationality refers to the ability of an individual to consistently
make decisions that maximize that individual’s expected payoff given varying levels
of knowledge. In the absence of ‘uncertainty’ rationality implies an individual’s full
knowledge (i.e., complete information) of the structure of the game, cognitive ability
to weigh different choices and deliberately make optimal decisions. In the presence
of uncertainty about the game structure (i.e., incomplete information) rationality
Javier Gonza´lez · Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov
Graduate School of Economics, UANL, Av. La´zaro Ca´rdenas S/N,
Monterrey, N.L., Mexico 64890
e-mail: javier.gonzalez.g@gmail.com,kalashnikov_de@yahoo.de
J. Watada et al. (Eds.): Intelligent Decision Technologies, Vol. 1, SIST 15, pp. 109–118.
springerlink.com c© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
110 G. Javier and V.V. Kalashnikov
implies an individual’s ability to choose actions that maximize expected payoffs
given full knowledge of all possible games and their distribution. It is the assump-
tion of rational behavior when players are uncertain about the probability distribu-
tion their opponents assign to the different ‘states’ of the game that we seek to relax.
Then implications of relaxing said assumption on the existence and uniqueness of
a Nash equilibrium are analyzed. Our goal is to introduce this alternative view of
uncertainty in decision making in economic interactions with the purpose of formu-
lating an alternative model of decision making in bilateral bargaining games with
incomplete information.
Under the assumption of (super) rationality in the absence of uncertainty, in 1950
John Nash [6] developed an axiomatic framework to form an equilibrium solution to
the bilateral bargaining problem. While valid under specific complete information
conditions, Nash’s bargaing model appears to be inconsistent with observed be-
havior when players are faced with incomplete information. Looking to overcome
Nash’s model inconsistencies, Jonh Harsanyi [2] formulated a model that accounts
for players with less-than-complete information about the structure of the game. In
the presence of (unmeasurable) uncertainty of the structure of bilateral bargaining
game, Harsanyi assumes players will form a commonly known set of possible game
structures and a corresponding probability distribution (i.e., imperfect information).
That is, players will transform a game of unknown possible actions and outcomes
into a game where the distribution of all possible actions and outcomes is com-
monly known. Thus, players can form an expectation of a set of possible actions
that satisfies the conditions for a Nash Equilibrium.
While Harsanyi’s model holds under common knowledge of different sets of ac-
tions and outcomes with a common probability distribution, it appears to be incon-
sistent with observed behavior once players’ are endowed with different probability
distributions. The objective of the present study is to analyze the implications of
introducing unmeasurable uncertainty [4] (Knightian Uncertainty) into the existing
framework of bilateral bargaining models. Specifically, we model bilateral bargain-
ing where players assign different probabilities over all possible actions and out-
comes leading to a disagreement that is inconsistent with theoretical predictions.
Thus providing the foundation for a model of bilateral bargaining with incomplete
information under unmeasurable uncertainty.
We begin our task in section 2 by describing the general bilateral bargaining
model with incomplete information, and assuming rational behavior. We assume
each player has full knowledge of all the possible states of the game, as well as
the probability of each state. Thus we rewrite the game of incomplete information
as a game of imperfect information. Next in section 3 we relax the assumption of
rationality, introducing uncertainty of the probability a player assigns over all the
possible states of the game. Specifically, we allow each player to have a different
(subjective) probability distribution over all possible states. The implications of this
are examined conceptually, then illustrated by an example. Finally, conclusions are
provided in section 4.
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2 Measurable Uncertainty and Mutual Consistency of Beliefs
in Bilateral Bargaining
Under Nash’s axiomatic model [6] with complete information for a bilateral bar-
gaining game with a solution of the form
f N (S,d) = argmax
(d1,d2)≤(x1,x2)∈S
(x1 − d1) (x2 − d2)
subject to a bargaining set
S (d) =
{
(x1,x2) ∈ S |x1 + x2 ≤ c, xi ≥ di, S ⊂ R2
}
where xi is the payoff demand for player i within the agreement convex space S.
This set is bounded below by a disagreement payoff di and it is assumed that both
players have complete knowledge of each other’s possible actions. To take account
of incomplete information in games, Harsanyi [2] proposed a model that transforms
a game of incomplete information into a game of imperfect information. Under
the framework of incomplete information with measurable uncertainty proposed by
Harsanyi, the information of the different sets of actions and payoffs are associated
with a distribution of ‘player types’ with given probabilities. Thus, in the context
of a bilateral bargaining game with a normal form for each player i = 1,2 with an
arbitrary number of types k, a vector of types for player i is represented by ci ={
c1i ,c
2
i , . . . ,c
k
i
}
which is used to normalize strategies under complete information
for every possible k type such that si → s∗i = s∗i (ci) =
{
s∗i
(
c1i
)
,s∗i
(
c2i
)
, . . . ,s∗i
(
cki
)}
,
and each player i has a vector of subjective probabilities (probability distribution)
of all the possible types for his opponent given his own, such that ¯Pi (c j) = Pi (c j|ci)
for j = 1,2, j 	= i. Let Si be the set of all possible strategies for all k types for player
i = 1,2, Ci = {ci} the set of all vector types. Let the game of incomplete information
be defined as G = {S1,S2,C1,C2,V1,V2,P1,P2} where Vi : [S1× S2×C1 ×C2] → R
represents player i’s payoff function.
Under the central assumption that the vectors of subjective probabilities of both
players are equal, i.e., ¯P1 (c2) = ¯P2 (c1) : Pi (c j|ci) =P∗ (c j|ci) for i, j ∈ {1,2} , i 	= j,
Harsanyi’s model claims that it is possible to derive a commonly known objective
probability distribution such that
P∗ (c j|ci) = P
∗ (ci,c j)∫
Cj d(c j)P
∗ (ci,c j)
⇒ P∗ (ci,c j) = P∗ (c) = Pi (ci,c j)
∫
Cj
d(c j)P
∗ (ci,c j)
(1)
Using player i’s normalized strategies, s∗i (ci), normalized payoffs are derived, xi =
Vi (s∗1 (c1) ,s∗2 (c2) ,c1,c2), which in turn provides a weighted sum of the normalized
strategies that are used to represent player i’s expected payoffs in the normal form
of the game:
Exi =Wi (s∗1,s∗2) =
∫
C
Vi (s∗1,s∗2)d(c)P∗ (c)
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which can be modified to account for player i’s expected payoffs given his own type
E (xi|ci) = Zi (s∗1,s∗2|ci) =
∫
Cj
Vi (s∗1,s∗2,c1,c2)d(c j)P
∗ (c j|ci)
Assuming that for player i’s normalized strategy, s∗i , a specific vector of types,
c0i , there exists a corresponding optimal ordinary strategy si = s∗i (ci) that maxi-
mizes the expected payoff, E
(
xi|c0i
)
= Zi
(
s∗1,s
∗
2|c0i
)
such that s∗i is the best re-
sponse for c0i given his opponent’s strategy s∗j , then for s∗i being a uniformly best
response for ci except for a small subset of types c∗i – with probability nearly
zero –
{
s∗i ∪ s∗j
}
, i, j ∈ {1,2} , i 	= j gives us an equilibrium point. This implies
that in order to have an equilibrium for the complete and imperfect information
G∗ = {s1,s2,c1,c2,V1,V2,P∗}, which is analog to the game of incomplete informa-
tion G, it is sufficient and necessary for the set of normalized strategies s∗ = (s∗1,s∗2)
to be a Nash Equilibrium.
Holding the assumption of mutually consistent subjective probability distribu-
tions, P∗i = P∗ (c) , i = 1,2, with know player type vectors {c1,c2}, a generalized
bilateral bargaining model is elaborated subject to a set of all possible agreements
defined as
X (d) = {(x1 (c1) ,x2 (c2)) |x1 (c1)+ x2 (c2)≤ z, xi (ci)≥ di} (2)
where X ⊂ R2, di ≥ 0, for all possible combinations of known types given by the
Cartesian product C1 ×C2. Furthermore, given that the payoff for each player i,
xi (ci) is the weighted sum of all possible normalized strategies given ci, the set
of all possible agreements X (d) is the weighted sum of all the possible (k× k)
bargaining subsets of payoff vectors for all specific types, cl1 ∈C1, cm2 ∈C2, for all
l,m ∈ {1,2, . . . ,k}:
Xlm (d) =
{(
x1
(
cl1
)
,x2 (c
m
2 )
)
|xl1 + xm2 ≤ z, x•i ≥ d•i
}
, (3)
where each vector pair type specific bargaining subset Xlm (d) adheres to Nash for-
mulation and satisfies its conditions, such that there exists a rectangle Tlm formed by
the separating hyperplane that bounds Xlm (d) given a hyperbolic curve formed by
the objective function of the bargaining solution H = (x1 − d1)(x2 − d2). Thus, the
product of all type pair specific bargaining sets, which is a convex combination of
every set represented by (3), forms a set of all possible bargaining agreements such
that for C1 ×C2
X (d) = ∏
(l,m)∈(K,K)
Xlm (d) , K = {1,2, . . . ,k}
where the ∏ Xlm for (l,m) ∈ (K,K) provides a weighted sum given the distribu-
tion of possible types for the common probability matrix P∗. Using Nash’s axiom of
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independence of irrelevant alternatives, which states that the optimal point x∗ ∈ Xlm
is also the optimal point in Tlm, let the weighted space of all bounding Tlm rectangles
that forms a convex hull in R2+ be
T = ∏
(l,m)∈(K,K)
Tlm, K = {1,2, . . . ,k}
satisfying convexity conditions necessary for existence and uniqueness of a Nash
Equilibrium.
3 Unmeasurable Uncertainty and Inconsistency of Beliefs
in Bilateral Bargaining
While Harsanyi’s model with imperfect information holds under mutual consistency
among players’ probability distributions, Harsanyi [3] among others [5] recognized
the possible failure of this model upon relaxing the assumption of mutual consis-
tency. Specifically, Harsanyi acknowledge that by the nature of subjective probabil-
ities even when two individuals have the same information and the same level of in-
telligence, thy may still assign different subjective probabilities to the same events.
By relaxing the assumption of mutual consistency of the probability distributions
among players, P1 (c1,c2) 	= P2 (c1,c2). Thus, the ability to derive a common prob-
ability distribution P∗ to construct an analogous game of complete but imperfect
information G∗ is no longer valid.
It is assumed that the type vectors, ci =
(
c1i ,c
2
i , . . . ,c
k
i
)
, are commonly known by
both players while having different distributions of all the possible combinations of
type vector pairs that span the space of the cartesian product C1 ×C2. Then for each
player i according to their type vector, ci, and the corresponding set of normalized
strategies si = s∗i (ci) =
{
s∗i
(
c1i
)
,s∗i
(
c2i
)
, . . . ,s∗i
(
cki
)}
, we can define the game of
incomplete information G = {S1,S2,C1,C2,V1,V2,P1,P2} – where once again Vi :
[S1 × S2×C1×C2]→ R represents the payoffs for player i in the normal for of the
game.
Given the relaxation of mutual consistency of distributions, P1 	= P∗ 	= P2, each
player i will assign different normalized payoffs to both players. The difference
in normalized payoffs will produce a different weighted sum for each player.
Thus, the normalized payoffs according to player i’s distribution such that xii =
Vi
(
si∗1 (c1) ,s
i∗
2 (c2) ,c1,c2
)
and xij =Vj
(
si∗1 (c1) ,s
i∗
2 (c2) ,c1,c2
)
for i, j ∈ {1,2} , i 	= j
will produce different agreement vectors than those produced according to player
j’s, .ie., (xi1,xi2
) 	=
(
x
j
1,x
j
2
)
. Specifically, the expected payoffs in the normal form
of the game will differ among players given that each player’s weighted sum will
assign a different probability weighting over the space of all possible combinations
of type vector pairs, such that
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E
(
xii|ci
)
=
∫
Cj
Vi
(
si∗i ,s
i∗
j ,ci,c j
)
d(c j)P
i
i (c j|ci) , E
(
xij|c j
)
=
=
∫
Ci
Vj
(
si∗i ,s
i∗
j ,ci,c j
)
d(ci)P
i
j (ci|c j)
for i, j ∈ {1,2} , i 	= j where Pij (ci|c j) is player i’s estimate of the conditional prob-
ability player j assigns ˆPj = P ji for ci given c j. Thus, player i uses a sum expected
payoffs which assigns a different probability weight for each possible normalized
strategy, E
(
x
j
j|c j
)
	= E
(
xij|c j
)
.
Let us suppose that both players wrongly assume that their subjective prob-
ability distributions are mutually consistent such that Pii = ˆPi and P
j
j = ˆPj for
i, j ∈ {1,2} , i 	= j. Thus, each player i will be trying to solve a different game of
imperfect information G∗i =
{
Si∗1 ,Si∗2 ,C1,C2,V1,V2,Pi∗
}
where Pi∗ is what player i
perceives to be the commonly known probability distribution over all possible type
vectors. For the generalized bargaining model defined in the previous section with
known type vectors {c1,c2} and mutually inconsistent (unknown) probability dis-
tributions, Pi 	= Pj → Pi∗ 	= P j∗, the set of all possible agreements given the set of
expected payoffs for both players according to player i, xi =
(
xii,x
i
j
)
such that
Xi (d) =
{(
xi1 (c1) ,x
i
2 (c2)
) |xi1 (c1)+ xi2 (c2)≤ z,xii (ci)≥ di
} (4)
for di ≥ 0, i = 1,2 will be different than the set of all possible agreements given the
set of expected payoffs for both players according to player j, x j =
(
x
j
i ,x
j
j
)
such
that for xi 	= x j −→ Xi (d) 	= X j (d), where both are sets are in R2.
While the set of all possible (k× k) type vector pair combinations from the carte-
sian product of all type vectors for each player, C1 ×C2, remain the same, given
different probability weighting of all normalized strategies, any particular combi-
nation of type vector pair, cl1,cm2 for l,m ∈ {1,2, . . . ,k} will produce different type
vector specific bargaining sets, such that
Xilm (d) =
{(
xi1
(
cl1
)
,xi2 (c
m
2 )
)
|xi1
(
cl1
)
+ xi2 (c
m
2 )≤ z,x•i ≥ d•i
}
(5)
for i = 1,2; l,m ∈ {1,2} , where (5) satisfies the conditions for Nash solution and
it is bounded by a rectangle T ilm formed by a separating hyperplane produced by
the hyperbolic curve formed by the objective function in Nash’s bargaining solu-
tion, H =
(
xi1 − d1
)(
xi2 − d2
)
according what player i perceives to be the vector
of expected payoffs for both players, xi =
(
xi1,x
i
2
)
. Thus, given different probabil-
ity weighting for a specific vector type pair,
(
cl1,c
m
2
)
, Xilm 	= X jlm, their respective
weighted sums of all possible type vector specific agreements will form different
sets of all possible convex combinations in C1 ×C2:
Xi (d) = ∏
(l,m)∈(K,K)
Xilm (d) 	= X j (d) = ∏
(l,m)∈(K,K)
X jlm (d)
An Alternative View of Uncertainty in Bilateral Bargaining Models 115
for K = {1,2, . . . ,k}. Thus, by Nash’s axiom of Pareto optimality where(
xi∗1
(
cl1
)
,xi∗2 (c
m
2 )
) ∈ Xilm →
(
xi∗1
(
cl1
)
,xi∗2 (c
m
2 )
) ∈ T ilm, the weighted sum for each
player i of all possible type vector specific agreements will produce a convex hull
for the affine combination of all bounding rectangles T ilm ∈ R2+, where T ilm 	= T jlm
such that
T i = ∏
(l,m)∈(K,K)
T ilm 	= T j = ∏
(l,m)∈(K,K)
T jlm
for i, j ∈ {1,2} , l,m∈ {1,2} , i 	= j, l 	=m. While both convex hulls formed by T i and
T j satisfy the convexity conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, the expected
equilibrium payoffs formed by both players will differ. Thus, leading to a bargaining
process whereby neither Pareto nor Nash equilibria can be reached – aside from the
disagreement point. That is, the weights assigned to their normalized strategies will
lead to different expectations as to what the payoff demands should be according
to each player’s type. Thus, the affine combination of their demands could result in
payoff demand vectors outside the space formed by the union of both spaces of all
possible agreements. This breaks the convexity (preserving) condition necessary for
the existence of an equilibrium, which leads to the inability of players reaching a
bargaining solution.
3.1 Example of a Bilateral Bargaining Game with Incomplete
Information and Inconsistency of Probability Distributions
Let us suppose two players are playing a game of dividing $100 where the privately
known payoff demand of player i is y∗i for i = 1,2. If the sum of players’ payoff
demands do not exceed the given amount, i.e., y∗1 + y∗2 ≤ 100, each player receives
the payoff amount demanded, yi = y∗i . Otherwise, both players receive 0. Given the
set of pure payoff demands and the set of types for each player, ci ∈ {a1,a2}, the set
of expected payoffs for player i are defined by
xi =
1
2
yi × 1(ci = a1)+ yi × 1(ci = a2)
where 1(·) is an indicator function and each player assigns a different probability to
each possible type vector combination given by
C1 ×C2 = {(a1,a1) ,(a1,a2) ,(a2,a1) ,(a2,a2)} .
Let us assume that both players assign a negative correlation of types such that
Pr (c j = am|ci = al) = 1 where i, j ∈ {1,2} , l,m ∈ {1,2} , i 	= j, l 	= m. If player 1
assigns an equal probability of having a pair of type vectors (c1,c2) = (a1,a2) or
(c1,c2) = (a2,a1) such that p112 = p121 =
1
2 , then the vector of expected payoffs
according to player 1 is given by
x1 =
(
x11,x
1
2
)
=
1
2
· x1∗+ 1
2
· x1∗∗
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where x1∗ represents the possible payoff vectors given the pair of type vectors
(c1,c2) = (a1,a2) and x1∗∗ represents the possible payoff vectors given the pair
of type vectors (c1,c2) = (a2,a1). Thus, player 1 will formulate a weighted sum of
possible payoff vectors for each player such that
x11 =
1
2
·
(
50− 1
2
x2
)
+
1
2
(100− 2x2)
x12 =
1
2
· (100− 2x1)+ 12 ·
(
50− 1
2
x1
)
and form a space of all possible expected payoffs in the following manner.
• First, under the cooperative framework where player 1 receives the full amount
x1 = 100 while player 2 receives nothing x2 = 0 when (c1,c2) = (a2,a1) and
player 1 receives nothing x1 = 0 while player 2 receives the full amount x2 = 100
with an equal probability of 12 , the expected Pareto optimal equilibrium payoff
according to player 1 is
(
x11,x
1
2
)
= (50,50).
• Then, under the non-cooperative framework where each player’s expected payoff
is formed by the weighted sum of the Nash equilibrium outcomes under each
pair of type vectors, the expected Nash equilibrium payoff according to player 1
is
(
x11,x
1
2
)
= (37.5,37.5).
• Finally, when players agree that player 1 receives the upper bound payment while
player 2 receives the lowest bound payment the expected payoff vector accord-
ing to player 1 is
(
x11,x
1
2
)
= (75,0). When players agree that player 1 receives
the lowest bound payment while player 2 receives the upper bound payment the
expect payoff according to player 1 is
(
x11,x
1
2
)
= (0,75).
Thus, the weighted space of all possible affine combinations of expected payoffs
according to player 1 is represented by the convex hull shown in the figure below
and is denominated as X1.
Let us now assume that player 2 assigns unequal probabilities to the different
pairs of type vectors where (c1,c2) = (a1,a2) has a probability p212 = 34 while
(c1,c2) = (a2,a1) has a probability p221 = 14 . The the vector of expected payoffs
according to player 2 is given by
x2 =
(
x21,x
2
2
)
=
3
4
· x2∗+ 1
4
· x2∗∗
where x2∗ represents the possible payoff vectors given the pair of type vectors
(c1,c2) = (a1,a2) and x2∗∗ represents the possible payoff vectors given the pair
of type vectors (c1,c2) = (a2,a1). Thus, player 2 will formulate a weighted sum of
possible payoff vectors for each player such that
x21 =
3
4
·
(
50− 1
2
x2
)
+
1
4
· (100− 2x2)
x22 =
3
4
· (100− 2x1)+ 14 ·
(
50− 1
2
x2
)
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and through a similar process but with different weights than player 1, the result-
ing space of all possible expected payoffs is formed by: (1) the expected Pareto
optimal equilibrium payoff according to player 2,
(
x21,x
2
2
)
= (32.5,60); (2) the
expected Nash equilibrium according to player 2,
(
x21,x
2
2
)
= (31.25,43.75); (3)
the upper bound payment for player 1 and lower bound payment for player 2,(
x21,x
2
2
)
= (62.5,0), and the lower bound payment for player 1 and upper bound
payment for player 2,
(
x21,x
2
2
)
= (0,87.5). Thus, the weighted space of all possible
affine combinations of expected payoffs according to player 2 is represented by the
convex hull.
By having different probability distributions over the set of possible pairs of type
vectors, P1 	= P2, each player generates different weighted sums of possible out-
comes. Thus, each player has different space of possible solutions with different
probability weights assigned to their normalized strategies. Players will formulate
different sets of optimal best-response strategies under the erroneous belief that both
players have the same (mutually reinforcing) probability distribution. So even when
both players have common knowledge of the structure of the game and agree to
cooperate, given different distributions of probabilities of the different states, the
models based on the assumption of rationality with mutual consistency of proba-
bility distributions fail to account for instance of nonexistence or uniqueness of an
equilibrium.
4 Conclusions
As it was show in the previous example, we have a very different structure as com-
pared to Nash and Harsanyi’s models. The difference is explained by different dis-
tributions of the players’ strategies. As it has been shown in experimental studies [1]
[10] where players are privately induced with different distributions of all possible
outcomes, when opposing players with different expectations of equilibrium payoff
demands try to reach an agreement theory predictions are no longer consistent with
observed behavior [1]. Far from attempting to discard existing models of bilateral
bargaining of complete but imperfect information [2], we offer an alternative view
of uncertainty to explain inconsistencies with theoretical predictions. Specifically,
we develop a framework that accounts for varying degrees of knowledge and mutual
consistency of beliefs in bilateral bargaining. Our goal in this particular analysis is
to put forward a conjecture that establishes a direct relationship between the degree
of inconsistency in beliefs among individuals and their ability to reach an agree-
ment. Thus, providing the foundation for building a model of bilateral bargaining
with incomplete information under an unmeasurable uncertainty framework [4].
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